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ESSAYS
INSURANCE AT THE ENERGY-WATER NEXUS
Donald T. Hornstein *
INTRODUCTION
As the outstanding contributions to this symposium demonstrate, the on-the-ground connections between water and energy
are pervasive, multidimensional, and sobering. And, at the legal
nexus between water and energy, the symposium’s contributors
generally hint at some mix of land-use controls, common-law liability, or regulation to help mediate the challenges. Yet precisely
because the challenges are so sobering, perhaps an even broader
range of social institutions and solutions ought to be considered.
In this essay, I offer some observations of the role that insurance
may play at the energy-water nexus.
In so doing, this essay reflects a vantage point familiar to those
who follow the insurance-as-society1 or insurance-as-governance2
literatures. The premise of this body of work is that the institu* Aubrey L. Brooks Professor of Law, University of North Carolina School of Law.
Even though my experience with insurance and weather comes partly from my role as an
appointed public member of the North Carolina Wind Pool, a $400 million insurance facility, the views expressed in this essay do not in any way reflect the views of the Wind Pool
or even my own views when operating as a member of the Wind Pool’s Board of Directors.
1. See, e.g., Deborah Stone, Beyond Moral Hazard: Insurance as Moral Opportunity,
in EMBRACING RISK: THE CHANGING CULTURE OF INSURANCE AND RESPONSIBILITY 52, 54
(Tom Baker & Jonathan Simon eds., 2002) (describing insurance as a social system of linking oneself to the risks of harm faced by others); Jeffrey W. Stempel, The Insurance Policy
as Social Instrument and Social Institution, 51 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1489, 1498–1500
(2010) (describing the widespread need for insurance as a precondition for engaging in a
wide array of social and economic activities).
2. See, e.g., RICHARD V. ERICSON ET AL., INSURANCE AS GOVERNANCE 47–49 (2003)
(describing insurance as, among other things, a system to classify, allocate, and manage
risk).
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tion of insurance operates to embed individuals into social pools
of similarly situated insureds, thereby reinforcing various types
of social norms, and to incentivize certain actions, thereby regulating the behavior of insureds. Under this conception, insurance
slips the bridle of a mere bilateral contract between insured and
insurer, and “functions like government by influencing policy3
holders’ conduct and protecting them against misfortune.”
I. THE INSURANCE-ENERGY NEXUS: LIABILITY INSURANCE
For many, hydraulic fracturing (“fracking”) is near the epicenter of the energy-water debate. In part, this is due to the novel
risks of water contamination by fracking fluids,4 to the contamination of water wells with methane,5 and to dangers to water
supplies from fracking fluid waste treatment via underground injection wells or surface sewage treatment facilities.6 And, in part,
the salience of fracking to the energy-water nexus comes from the
speed with which hydraulic fracturing has spread across the
United States, especially for the production of natural gas. Due to
fracking, natural gas production in the United States has increased by 25% since 2008.7
To some extent, reliance on insurance-as-governance as to
fracking stems from the scattered and fragile regulatory apparatus that has, in recent years, tried to keep up with developments on the ground. As Columbia law professors Thomas Merrill
and Dean David Schizer conclude in their recent survey of the
regulatory environment, “[g]iven the traditional primacy of states
in oil and gas regulation, federal law has little to say about fracturing,”8 and, as to state and local government regulation, “[s]ince
3. Kenneth S. Abraham, Four Conceptions of Insurance, 161 U. PA. L. REV. 653, 684
(2013).
4. See Thomas W. Merrill & David M. Schizer, The Shale Oil and Gas Revolution,
Hydraulic Fracturing, and Water Contamination: A Regulatory Strategy, 98 MINN. L. REV.
145, 180–92 (2013) (discussing migration of fracking fluid through subsurface creeks, surface spills, risks due to the surface storage of flow-back and produced water, risks to
groundwater from leakage of frack fluids through cracked well casings, and blowouts).
5. Id. at 192–93.
6. Id. at 195–96.
7. Id. at 154 (citing 1 IHS GLOBAL INSIGHT, AMERICA’S NEW ENERGY FUTURE: THE
UNCONVENTIONAL OIL AND GAS REVOLUTION AND THE US ECONOMY 3 (2012), available at
http://www.energyxxi.org/sites/default/files/pdf/americas_new_energy_future-unconventio
nal_oil_and_gas.pdf).
8. Id. at 200. In addition, Merrill and Schizer note that fracking-related wastes enjoy
exemptions from the federal Resource Conservation and Recovery Act, the Safe Drinking
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fracturing [is] . . . [a] relatively new practice[], it is not surprising
that regulatory regimes governing [it] are not fully developed.”9
Precisely because of the still-emerging, chaotic regulatory environment, not to mention such common regulatory pathologies
as incomplete information and capture, law professors David Dana and Hannah Wiseman take a page from the insurance-asgovernance playbook and call for increased use of insurance as a
10
“market-based” approach to hydraulic fracturing. They argue
that:
[Where regulatory regimes] are constrained by possible “capture”
and insufficient enforcement resources, insurance can help fill in the
monitoring and enforcement gap by bringing to bear another regulatory force—private insurance companies—that cannot be captured in
the way legislators or agencies can be and that are not constrained
11
by the pathologies of the budgetary appropriations processes.

To guard against adverse selection in their proposed regime—
the danger that only high-risk fracking companies would obtain
the requisite liability/remediation insurance—Dana and Wiseman propose that government compel all companies with fracking-related operations to purchase the insurance.12
How should one approach the Dana/Wiseman proposal? To
begin, one needs to consider the risks of moral hazard in any insurance-as-regulation regime—the danger that insureds will actually increase risky behavior precisely because they have insurance.13 There are a variety of design features that insurers use to
counteract moral hazard: deductibles and co-payments so that insureds have first-dollar “skin in the game,” exclusions of particularly risky or intentional behavior, and overall maximum dollar

Water Act, and the Emergency Planning and Community Right-to-Know Act. Id. at 200–
01.
9. Id. at 197.
10. See David A. Dana & Hannah J. Wiseman, A Market Approach to Regulating the
Energy Revolution: Assurance Bonds, Insurance, and the Certain and Uncertain Risks of
Hydraulic Fracturing, 99 IOWA L. REV. (forthcoming 2014) (manuscript at 3, 10), available
at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2353061.
11. Id. at 21.
12. Id. at 35.
13. See, e.g., Tom Baker, On the Genealogy of Moral Hazard, 75 TEX. L. REV. 237,
241–44 (1996) (discussing the development of the “moral hazard” concept); Steven Shavell,
On Moral Hazard and Insurance, 93 Q.J. ECON. 541, 541–42 (1979) (discussing the tendency of insurance protection to change a person’s motive to prevent loss); cf. Kenneth J.
Arrow, Uncertainty and the Welfare Economics of Medical Care, 53 AM. ECON. REV. 941,
961 (1963) (discussing the effects of medical insurance on incentives).
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limits on an insurer’s duty to indemnify. Properly designed, the
goal is for insurance to institutionalize loss prevention by insureds by incentivizing risk-reduction behavior via premium price
differentiation and the ability to demand written representations
by insureds of risk-reduction commitments and procedures.
Based on design features such as these, Dana and Wiseman state:
“‘Insurers’ are thus ‘strategically well placed to gather information and engage in risk management, and reflect these costs
14
through premium differentiation.’”
But this is not to say that liability insurance always delivers
risk reduction in practice. In a recent study on the risk-reduction
achievements of directors’ & officers’ (“D&O”) liability insurance,
Tom Baker and Sean Griffith are decidedly lukewarm, if not outright critical:
Do insurers offer loss prevention services to their corporate insureds? And, relatedly, do insurers monitor the corporate governance
of their insureds? We found that the answer to both of these questions was: they do not. The participants in our study unanimously
reported that D&O insurers do not offer real loss prevention services
15
or otherwise monitor corporate governance.

On the other hand, Dana and Wiseman report on a much more
hopeful study, by Haitao Yin, Howard Kunreuther, and Matthew
White, finding a “dramatic decline in leaks from underground fuel
tanks . . . when gas stations were required to carry private clean16
up and liability insurance.” That study found that “the price
structure for market-based insurance gives [gas] tank owners
economic incentives to invest in equipment that reduces the
chance of accidental fuel tank leaks.”17 The results of these two
studies are not necessarily in conflict, as the D&O study focused
on the effects of insurance-induced monitoring while the gas station study focused on the effects of insurance price differentiation.18

14. Dana & Wiseman, supra note 10, at 37 (quoting BENJAMIN J. RICHARDSON,
ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION THROUGH FINANCIAL ORGANISATIONS: COMPARATIVE
PERSPECTIVES ON THE INDUSTRIALISED NATIONS 363 (2002)).
15. Tom Baker & Sean J. Griffith, The Missing Monitor in Corporate Governance: The
Directors’ & Officers’ Liability Insurer, 95 GEO. L.J. 1795, 1798–99 (2007).
16. Dana & Wiseman, supra note 10, at 38 (citing Haitao Yin et al., Does Private Insurance Reduce Environmental Accidents?, REGULATION, Summer 2012, at 36, 37, available at http://object.cato.org/sites/cato.org/files/serials/files/regulation/2012/8/v35n2-5.pdf.
17. Haitao Yin et al., supra note 16, at 37.
18. Yet Baker and Griffith also reported in another article on the risk-reduction bene-
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Thus, perhaps the best one can say as to hydraulic fracturing,
at least as a matter of theory, is that it is possible, even if not assured, that a system of mandatory liability insurance may add
value to the regulatory regimes that are emerging at the energywater nexus. That said, as a matter of practice, the current role of
liability insurance in hydraulic fracturing is highly uncertain. To
begin, unlike the recommendation made by Dana and Wiseman,
only one state currently mandates the purchase of liability insur19
ance for those engaged in fracking. And the extent of voluntary
insurance penetration among drillers is not entirely clear. The
Center for Insurance Policy and Research, of the National Association of Insurance Commissioners, reports that, “[m]ost drilling
companies carry commercial general liability insurance (CGL),
which protects them against third-party bodily injury and proper20
ty damage claims.” Yet, even aside from questions of coverage in
the standard CGL policy, at least one industry risk-management
newsletter refers to “hundreds of small companies active in shale
gas production with typically minimal pollution liability coverage” and the use of “site-specific LLC/LLP corporations that are
dissolved after operations are completed.”21 On the supply side, at
least one major insurer, Nationwide Insurance Company, announced in 2012, “[a]fter months of research and discussion, we
have determined that the exposures presented by hydraulic fracturing are too great to ignore. . . . [and] are now prohibited for
[Nationwide CGL and other Nationwide policies].”22 And, although not directly affecting the availability of primary coverage,

fits of D&O price differentiation and found that, although D&O insurers did attempt to
price on the basis of risk, “the highly discretionary nature of the D&O insurance underwriting process and the competitive pressures of the insurance underwriting cycle limit
the ability of corporate and securities law deterrence objectives to be fully reflected in the
pricing of D&O insurance.” Baker & Griffith, supra note 15, at 1798 (citing Tom Baker &
Sean J. Griffith, Predicting Corporate Governance Risk: Evidence from the Directors’ &
Officers’ Liability Insurance Market, 74 U. CHI. L. REV. 487, 487–89 (2007)).
19. Dana & Wiseman, supra note 10, at 56 (citations omitted) (“However, only one
state (Maryland) and no major unconventional oil and gas state has yet enacted a mandatory insurance requirement.”).
20. Ctr. for Ins. Policy & Research, Hydraulic Fracturing, NAT’L ASS’N OF INS.
COMMISSIONERS, http://www.naic.org/cipr_topics/topic_hydraulic_fracturing.htm (last updated Jan. 15, 2014).
21. Bhavini Kamarshi et al., Fracking: Considerations for Risk Management and Financing, MILLIMAN (June 21, 2012), http://www.milliman.com/insight/insurance/FrackingConsiderations-for-risk-management-and-financing/.
22. Mary Esch, Nationwide Insurance: Fracking Damage Won’t Be Covered,
HUFFINGTON POST (July 12, 2012, 7:04 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/07/13/
nationwide-insurance-fracking_n_1669775.html.
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“[s]ome major global reinsurers . . . remain unwilling to take on
fracking and well drilling risks in shale plays until operating,
regulatory, and legal liability issues become clearer.”23
Yet even assuming that the basic CGL policy is available and
purchased by companies involved in fracking, it is hardly clear
that the basic coverage suffices to support strong riskmanagement practices by drillers. Largely, this is because the
24
basic CGL policy contains a “pollution exclusion” clause. And, as
one insurance-industry white paper states: “Pollution and contamination exclusions afford a strong basis to preclude coverage
for claimed environmental damage related to fracking since exclusions are unambiguous and enforceable in most circumstanc25
es.”
An endorsement that adds liability coverage for fracking operations, known as Environmental Impairment Liability (“EIL”) coverage, is sometimes available.26 But as another insuranceindustry consultant states: “While a dozen or more large insurers
will write EIL coverage for energy companies generally, only five
or six will write . . . for well owners or contractors with significant
fracking operations.”27 Although by one estimate 30% to 40% of
the industry purchases EIL policies,28 “many decide against
spending the money and rely instead on [CGL] policies.”29 Needless to say, a market-based regime based on liability insurance in
the fracking industry is only as effective as the market penetration of meaningful liability insurance in the first place.
Before leaving the topic of liability insurance, however, consid23. Peter Behr, Hydraulic Fracturing: Insurance Issues Loom over Shale Gas Development, E&E NEWS: ENERGYWIRE (Aug. 1, 2013), http://www.eenews.net/stories/10599
85449.
24. See JONATHAN L.S. HODES, POLLUTION EXCLUSION CLAUSES IN THE CGL POLICY:
CURRENT ISSUES IN COVERAGE LITIGATION 1 (2009), available at http://www.cwilson.com/
publications/insurance/pollution-exclusion-clauses.pdf.
25. NELSON LEVINE DE LUCA & HAMILTON, THE FUSS OVER FRACKING: AN
EXAMINATION OF THE INSURANCE ISSUES ASSOCIATED WITH HYDRO-FRACKING 22 (2013),
http://www.nldhlaw.com/content/uploads/2013/08/The-Fuss-Over-Fracking.pdf.
26. Braden Reddall & Ben Berkowitz, Analysis: Insurers Find It Tough to Price Fracking Risk, REUTERS (May 11, 2012, 3:08 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/05/11/usfracking-insurance-idUSBRE84A13R20120511.
27. Douglas McLeod, Insurance Coverage Options for Fracking Risks Are Limited,
BUS. INS., (Feb. 24, 2013, 6:00 PM), http://www.businessinsurance.com/article/20130224/
NEWS07/302249991?tags=69|310|76|303.
28. Id.
29. Id. (quoting Mike Schneider, president of Cravens Warren & Co., an insuranceindustry advising firm).
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er briefly the converse of an insurance-as-regulation approach—
the extent to which the absence of liability insurance might send
a proper market signal that improves the energy-water nexus. In
doing so, consider the much wider connection between energy and
water: that emissions of greenhouse gases from fossil-fuelpowered electricity plants affect the climate with profound water30
related consequences. Alleging just such a connection, the Inupiat Native Alaskans in the village of Kivalina sued the AES
Corporation (“AES”), a Virginia-based energy company, alleging
that emissions from AES’s fossil-fuel-based plants had contributed to climate change that melted the sea ice adjacent to their
coastal Alaskan town, leaving it vulnerable to significant erosion
31
from ocean storm surges. As a matter of substantive environ32
mental law, the case has caused its own surge of commentary.
But, much less noticed is the insurance-law dispute that arose in
the shadow of this litigation.
Upon being sued, AES asked its Virginia-based liability insurer, Steadfast Insurance Co., to provide a defense.33 After first filing a reservation of rights, Steadfast provided a defense, but then
brought a declaratory judgment action claiming that “it did not
owe AES a defense or indemnity coverage” under the policy.34
Among the reasons given by the insurer was that the CGL policies only covered “occurrences,” defined as involving, “an accident,
including continuous or repeated exposure to substantially the
35
same general harmful condition.” The insurer argued that a
30. See, e.g., Lenny Bernstein et al., Synthesis Report, in CLIMATE CHANGE 2007:
CONTRIBUTION OF WORKING GROUPS I, II, AND III TO THE FOURTH ASSESSMENT REPORT OF
THE INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE 49, 50 (2007).
31. See Native Village of Kivalina v. ExxonMobil Corp., 663 F. Supp. 2d 863, 868
(N.D. Cal. 2009).
32. See, e.g., Ashley E. Breakfield, Note, Political Cases or Political Questions: The
Justiciability of Public Nuisance Climate Change Legislation and the Impact on Native
Village of Kivalina v. ExxonMobil, 17 HASTINGS W.-NW. J. ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 39, 61 (2011)
(suggesting that the Ninth Circuit should reverse the district court’s decisions in Kivalina); Nicole Johnson, In Brief, Native Village of Kivalina v. ExxonMobil Corp: Say
Goodbye to Federal Public Nuisance Claims for Greenhouse Emissions, 40 ECOLOGY L.Q.
557, 558 (2013) (arguing that federal common law public nuisance claims for greenhouse
gas emissions are no longer a viable avenue for seeking relief); Samantha Lawson, Note,
The Conundrum of Climate Change Causation: Using Market Share Liability to Satisfy the
Identification Requirement in Native Village of Kivalina v. ExxonMobil Co., 22 FORDHAM
ENVTL. L. REV. 433, 492 (2011) (suggesting that market share liability is appropriate for
satisfying the identification requirement of causation in Kivalina).
33. AES Corp. v. Steadfast Ins. Co., 725 S.E.2d 532, 533 (Va. 2012).
34. Id.
35. Id. at 534 (internal quotation marks omitted).
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power plant’s burning of greenhouse-gas-emitting fossil fuels was
not an “occurrence,” and hence the insured’s liability for any resulting damages was excluded from coverage.36 The Supreme
Court of Virginia agreed, and held that the standard CGL policy
would not consider the intentional burning of fossil fuels to be an
“accident” that constituted an “occurrence” for which CGL policies
37
provide coverage.
As a matter of insurance-law doctrine, AES v. Steadfast is
hardly assured of being followed. It is one thing to state that an
insured intends to release greenhouse gases into the atmosphere,
and even to attribute to the insured the knowledge that greenhouse gases play some role in global warming and climate
change, but something else to attribute to a Virginia-based fossilfuel-plant operator either the knowledge or intention to cause
coastal erosion and flooding in a Native Alaskan village twothousand miles away. Whatever may be the challenges of the underlying tort claims of plaintiffs bringing lawsuits against insured energy generators (particularly as to the proximate-cause
38
element), it has long been traditional insurance-law doctrine
that the determination of whether a loss results from an “accident” is determined “from the point of view of the insured, whether the loss was unexpected, unusual and unforeseen.”39 Thus, as
Douglas DeBaugh insightfully observes: “[T]he [AES v. Steadfast]
court seems to make a critical (and perhaps liberal) inferential
jump from an anticipated and probable increase in greenhouse
gas in the atmosphere to . . . [an insured’s expectation of] erosion
experienced by [the] Kivalina plaintiffs.”40 Perhaps for this rea36. See id. at 533.
37. Id. at 538.
38. See, e.g., Stephen M. Johnson, From Climate Change and Hurricanes to Ecological
Nuisances: Common Law Remedies for Public Law Failures?, 27 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 565,
601 (2011) (indicating that climate change plaintiffs may have difficulty meeting the proximate cause element). But see Ken Alex, A Period of Consequences: Global Warming as
Public Nuisance, 26A STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 77, 94 n.88 (2007) (citing Holmes v. Sec. Investor
Prot. Corp., 503 U.S. 258, 268 (1992)) (suggesting that proximate cause reflects what justice demands).
39. Siagha v. Nat’l Fire Ins. Co. of Pittsburgh, 762 N.Y.S.2d 46, 47–48 (App. Div.
2003) (emphasis omitted) (citations omitted); see, e.g., Nat’l Union Fire Ins. Co. of Pittsburgh v. Terra Indus., Inc., 216 F. Supp. 2d 899, 919 (N.D. Iowa 2002) (“[W]here the insured neither intended nor expected . . . the damage, [there] was an ‘occurrence.’”); Gibson
v. Farm Family Mut. Ins. Co., 673 A.2d 1350, 1353 (Me. 1996) (noting that an “occurrence”
can follow even from an insured’s intentional act because the subsequent consequence
could be unintentional despite the act being intentional).
40. Douglas J. DeBaugh, Note, Marching Toward a Day of Reckoning: Dissecting the
Complex Intersection of Insurance Law and Climate Change Litigation Through AES Corp.
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son, Justice Mims states in his concurrence in AES v. Steadfast:
“Our jurisprudence . . . is leading inexorably to a day of reckoning
that may surprise many policy holders [in Virginia].”41
As a matter of the insurance-energy nexus and the concept of
insurance-as-governance, the implications of AES are even more
significant. If widely followed, AES would insulate the entire liability-insurance industry from any financial responsibility for the
climate-changing behavior of its insureds. From the standpoint of
insureds, the “naked” liability they would face could be enormous.
Nicholas Stern, the British economist, predicts that extreme
weather alone could cause losses approaching 0.5–1% of global
42
GDP by 2050. Potential losses have been estimated in the $850
43
billion to $1.3 trillion range. And from the standpoint of insurance-as-governance, without responsibility for these losses, liability insurers would have little reason institutionally to develop
climate-risk-reduction incentives for insureds.
II. THE INSURANCE-ENERGY NEXUS: FIRST PARTY PROPERTY
INSURANCE
In fact, the claim that private third-party liability insurers
would play a leading role in climate-change policy has never been
certain. On the one hand, as the world’s largest industry, with
$3.2 trillion in annual revenue,44 the insurance industry has been
described as the world’s foremost “global integrator” of climate45
related impacts. Yet, on the other hand, even before AES v.
Steadfast, the actual exposure of liability insurers for the climatechange-causing conduct of their insureds has never been large.46
v. Steadfast Ins. Co., 91 N.C. L. REV. (ADDENDUM) 95, 112 (2013).
41. 725 S.E.2d at 538 (Mims, J., concurring).
42. See DeBaugh, supra note 40, at 98 (citing NICHOLAS STERN, STERN REVIEW: THE
ECONOMICS OF CLIMATE CHANGE viii (2006)).
43. Id. at 98 (citing Anastasia Telesetsky, Insurance as a Mitigation Mechanism:
Managing International Greenhouse Gas Emissions Through Nationwide Mandatory Climate Change Catastrophe Insurance, 27 PACE ENVTL. L. REV. 691, 696 (2010)).
44. See Evan Mills, Insurance in a Climate of Change, 309 SCI. 1040, 1040 (2005) (“As
the world’s largest industry [[the insurance industry] would be the third largest country if
its $3.2 trillion in yearly revenues were compared with national gross domestic products
(GDPs)] . . . .”).
45. Id. (endnote omitted) (“The insurance sector is a lightning rod, serving as global
integrator of impacts across all sectors of the economy, and messenger of these impacts
through the terms and price signals it projects to its customers.”).
46. Cf. David Hunter & James Salzman, Negligence in the Air: The Duty of Care in
Climate Change Litigation, 155 U. PA. L. REV. 1741, 1744 (2007) (“We are aware of four
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Rather, many of the climate-related losses shouldered by insurers
have come from first-party insurance, such as from homeowners’
and other forms of property coverage.47
That said, the actual exposure of first-party insurers to climate-related risks is at best described as a work in progress and
at worst understood as a game of musical chairs in which property insurers make sure that they are not left standing when the
music stops. Since 1968, private first-party homeowners insurance has included a standard exclusion for “any loss” from “flood,
surface water, waves, tidal waves, overflow of a body of water,
48
[and] spray from these, whether or not driven by wind.” Insurers
have done this not only because flooding is a correlated risk, the
costs of which are more difficult to spread among a pool of insureds than randomized individual risks, but also because of the
adverse-selection risks of a market for flood insurance drawn
primarily from those who feel themselves most likely to be flooded.49 Instead, since 1968, the federal government has been forced
to provide flood insurance through the National Flood Insurance
Program (“NFIP”), a role it undertook partly as a way to reduce
the federal government’s growing outlays for disaster assistance.50
Technically, that leaves the standard (private) homeowners policy
to cover losses due to “wind,” including wind-caused losses from
extreme weather, but other provisions in most of these policies
draw arcane distinctions about causation that lead to perennial
“wind versus water” litigation in the wake of most extreme

[climate tort actions against private parties], but observers . . . expect the number to increase significantly.”).
47. E.g., Christina Ross, Evan Mills & Sean B. Hecht, Limiting Liability in the Greenhouse: Insurance Risk-Management Strategies in the Context of Global Climate Change,
26A STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 251, 277 (2007) (“[A] major portion of the $20.8 billion in total insured commercial losses from Hurricane Katrina were due to business interruptions.”).
48. See, e.g., Leonard v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 438 F. Supp. 2d 684, 689 (S.D.
Miss. 2006); cf. Jay S. Goldbaum, Katrina and Beyond: Judicial Treatment of Boilerplate
Language in Standardized Insurance Contracts, 2007 MICH. ST. L. REV. 453, 476–77
(2007).
49. See, e.g., Adam F. Scales, A Nation of Policyholders: Governmental and Market
Failure in Flood Insurance, 26 MISS. C. L. REV. 3, 7 (2006) (“[Flood insurance] suffers from
unusual demand- and supply-side constraints that make it a relatively difficult market for
insurers, and they have responded rationally by avoiding it.”).
50. Id. at 12 (“NFIP-backed insurance was conceived of as a way of inducing communities to adopt flood mitigation policies that the federal government . . . could not compel.”); see also Sandra Leon & Sandy Lubin, FEMA: Federal Disaster Relief, 17 GEN.
PRAC., SOLO & SMALL FIRM DIV. MAG. (American Bar Association), July–Aug. 2000, at 7
(communities that do not participate in NFIP are ineligible to participate in several of
FEMA’s disaster-assistance programs).
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weather events, such as hurricanes, in which both wind and
flooding occur.51
Even more to the point, in recent years private insurers have
increasingly been abandoning coverage for wind losses just as
they abandoned the market for flood insurance during the
52
1960s. Generally, they do this because state insurance regulators do not approve sufficient “rate” to make full coverage of wind
53
losses profitable. Those insurers who do not leave the market altogether, offer instead “hollowed out” coverage: reducing the areas where they remain willing to offer coverage, reducing the maximum amounts of coverage they are prepared to offer, and, as to
whatever insurance that is placed, forcing insureds to bear more
of the wind-related risks of storms through higher deductibles
54
and co-insurance. Increasingly, in place of private wind coverage, insureds rely on state-run wind pools; entities that bear a
conceptual similarity to the governmental insurance offered for
flood via the NFIP. Unlike the NFIP, however, state wind pools
“typically reflect the structure of residual high-risk insurance entities in which the state conditions the right to sell insurance
within the state with forced participation” in catastrophic wind
coverage.55 In short, except to the extent they are forced to participate in such wind pools, increasingly Nationwide is no longer on

51. See, e.g., Donald T. Hornstein, The Balkanization of CAT Property Insurance: Financing and Fragmentation in Storm Risks, 11 RUTGERS J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 9, 17–21 (2013)
(describing litigation under so-called “anti-concurrent-cause” clauses).
52. Id. at 23.
53. See id. at 26. For example, “[in] 2008, coastal homeowners’ coverage in North Carolina became a public policy issue when Farmers Insurance decided to withdraw from
property insurance statewide rather than participate in what it believed to be a system of
actuarially unfair rates.” Id. at 26 n.92; see Brian H. Kern, Farmers Insurance to Pull Out
of North Carolina Homeowners’ Market, INS. J. (Aug. 14, 2008), http://www.insurance
journal.com/news/southeast/2008/08/14/92787.htm. Similarly, in 2011, the North Carolina
Farm Bureau Insurance Co. significantly reduced its dwelling policy coverage at the coast,
again because of what it believed to be insufficient rates. See Michael Adams, North Carolina Farm Bureau to Raise Homeowners’ Rates, Drop Policies, INS. J. (Feb. 27, 2012), http:
//www.insurancejournal.com/news/southeast/2012/02/27/237291.htm.
54. See J. ROBERT HUNTER, CONSUMER FED’N OF AM., THE INSURANCE INDUSTRY’S
INCREDIBLE DISAPPEARING WEATHER CATASTROPHE RISK: HOW INSURERS HAVE SHIFTED
RISK AND COSTS ASSOCIATED WITH WEATHER CATASTROPHES TO CONSUMERS AND
TAXPAYERS 4–5 (Feb. 17, 2012), available at http://www.consumerfed.org/pdfs/Insurance
RegulationHurricaneRiskDisappearingCoverageStudy2-12.pdf; see also Hornstein, supra
note 51, at 26 n.92. For example, Allstate, which dropped approximately 320,000 policies
in Florida since 2004, is no longer offering any private homeowners coverage in the state.
Id. When four hurricanes hit Florida in 2004, even those who had insurance bore between
15% and 20% of the financial losses. Id. at 26.
55. Hornstein, supra note 51, at 51.
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your side, Allstate has withdrawn its good hands, and State
Farm, unlike a good neighbor, is not there.
The result is that, although the first-party (property) insurance industry regularly refers to the growing cost of covering
weather-related catastrophes, it has taken measures to shift that
56
loss to others. Thus, the NFIP, which until recently often offered
coverage at subsidized, below-cost rates, has since 2006 been
forced to borrow over $30 billion from the U.S. Treasury to cover
57
costs. Since 1989, Congress has been forced to enact over $410
billion in catastrophe-related emergency supplemental appropria58
tions. Aggregating what it terms “climate disruption costs,” the
Natural Resources Defense Council recently concluded that United States taxpayers outspend private insurers three-to-one to
59
cover such costs.
Ironically, it is against this background of fading insurance
coverage, at least as to private catastrophe coverage, that we may
be on the verge of a natural experiment of the insurance-asgovernance hypothesis. This is because Congress, in summer
2012, enacted the Biggert-Waters Flood Insurance Reform Act of
2012 (“Biggert-Waters”),60 the most significant revision of the
NFIP in a generation.61 Supported by a mix of balanced-budgetminded conservatives and environmentally-minded progressives,
Biggert-Waters sought to eliminate price subsidies for flood insurance.62 It did this by requiring actuarially fair rates for all
63
newly purchased properties and by phasing out subsidies for
second homes, business properties, severe repetitive-loss proper56.
57.

See, e.g., HUNTER, supra note 54, at 1.
See DANIEL LASHOF & ANDY STEVENSON, NATURAL RES. DEF. COUNCIL, NRDC
ISSUE PAPER IP:13-05A, WHO PAYS FOR CLIMATE CHANGE? 8 (2013), available at http:
//www. nrdc.org/globalwarming/files/taxpayer-climate-costs-IP.pdf.
58. Id. at 6 (footnote omitted) (“Since 1989, Congress has passed emergency supplemental appropriations totaling in excess of $410 billion in 2012 dollars, with more than
$140 billion authorized over the past 10 years alone, largely due to the 2005 hurricane
season ($55.9 billion) and Hurricane Sandy ($50.7 billion).”).
59. Id. at 3 (noting that of the $139 billion in climate-related damages in the United
States in 2012, private insurers covered only about 25% ($33 billion) of these costs).
60. Biggert-Waters Flood Insurance Reform Act of 2012, Pub. L. No. 112-141, 126
Stat. 916 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 4001–4129 (2006 & Supp. V 2012)).
61. See, e.g., Eli Lehrer, Strange Bedfellows: SmarterSafer.org and the Biggert-Waters
Act of 2012, 23 DUKE ENVTL. L. & POL’Y F. 351, 352 (2013) (footnote omitted) (“The Biggert-Waters Act may well be the largest revamping of the flood insurance program since
its origin in 1968.”).
62. Id. at 351, 353.
63. § 100205(a)(1)(B), 126 Stat. at 917 (to be codified at 42 U.S.C. § 4014(g)).
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ties, and homes substantially rebuilt after losses.64 Rates for primary residences that had been based on risks of flooding from
maps prepared by the Federal Emergency Management Agency
(“FEMA”), and that had previously been “grandfathered” even
when FEMA’s newer maps revealed increased flooding risks,
were to increase by 20% annually until their rates reflected the
65
actuarial risk. And FEMA was allocated $400 million annually
to increase its flood-mapping capacity, with Biggert-Waters requiring FEMA to produce or revise flood maps, using the “most
accurate topography and elevation data” for all areas within 10066
year and 500-year floodplains.
In the fifteen months following its enactment in July 2012,
Biggert-Waters became strong evidence of the insurance-asgovernance hypothesis, and of the idea that, to use the phrase
coined by Professor Adam Scales, the United States electorate
had become “a nation of policyholders” as much as it was a nation
of citizens.67 On October 29, 2012, the East Coast was hit by Superstorm Sandy, the strongest storm of the 2012 hurricane season and the second-worst storm, in terms of financial loss, in
American history.68 FEMA, unable to cover flood losses with its
then-underfinanced NFIP revenue base, was forced to request
over $50 billion in supplemental appropriations from Congress; a
request that prompted resistance from budget-minded conservatives and renewed agreement that Congress had wisely passed
69
Biggert-Waters to shore up NFIP finances. Yet, especially in the
64. § 100205(a)(1)(A), 126 Stat. at 917 (to be codified at 42 U.S.C. § 4014(a)(2)) (elimination of special subsidies); see also § 100205(c)(3), 126 Stat. at 918–19 (to be codified at
42 U.S.C. § 4015(e)(2)) (specified rate-increase provisions).
65. § 100207, 126 Stat. at 919 (to be codified at 42 U.S.C. § 4015(h)) (“Any increase in
the risk premium rate charged for flood insurance on any property that is covered by a
flood insurance policy on the effective date of such an update that is a result of such updating shall be phased in over a 5-year period, at the rate of 20 percent for each year following such effective date.”).
66. § 100216(b), 126 Stat. at 927–28 (to be codified at 42 U.S.C. § 4101(a)–(b)) (mandating ongoing program between Administrator and a Technical Mapping Advisory Council to review, update, and maintain NFIP rate maps with respect to the 100-year floodplain, the 500-year floodplain, areas of residual risk, areas that could be inundated in case
of failed flood control structures, and the level of protection provided by such structures); §
100216(f), 126 Stat. at 930 (to be codified at 42 U.S.C. § 4101b(f)) (allocating $400 million
annually between 2013 and 2017 to support FEMA’s flood-mapping capacity).
67. See Scales, supra note 49, at 47.
68. See David Porter, Hurricane Sandy Was Second-Costliest in U.S. History, Report
Shows, HUFFINGTON POST GREEN (Feb. 12, 2013, 10:32 AM), http://www.huffingtonpost.
com/2013/02/12/hurricane-sandy-second-costliest_n_2669686.html.
69. See, e.g., Raymond Hernandez, Hurricane Relief Bill Clears Hurdle in the Senate,
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immediate rebuilding aftermath of Superstorm Sandy, the financial impact of the Biggert-Waters rate increases began to attract
significant attention in the press. In mid-December 2012, FEMA
released new flood maps (the first change to New Jersey flood
70
maps in a generation) that caused highly publicized sticker
shock by already devastated Superstorm Sandy victims looking to
rebuild their homes. No longer protected (“grandfathered”) by low
71
rates set under previous maps, some homeowners faced the prospect of a ten-fold increase in annual premiums in order to pur72
chase the maximum NFIP coverage of $250,000 for structures.
There began what the press described as a “revolution” by policy73
holders against the new Biggert-Waters rates.
Perhaps because most Biggert-Waters rate increases were not
scheduled to take effect until October 2013, there was no acute
political reaction to FEMA’s newly released flood maps and the
agency’s corresponding new schedule of rate increases. In January 2013, New Jersey Governor Chris Christie announced that he
would not challenge the new maps and the higher rates they
presaged.74 But as more policyholders began to appreciate the
significance of the rate increases, political opposition began to
grow. An organization called “StopFEMANow” was created as a
Facebook Page by George Kasimos, a New Jersey resident affected by Superstorm Sandy, and, in September 2013, on the eve of
the new NFIP rate increases, it successfully organized protests by
hundreds of outraged policyholders in fifteen locations across ten
states.75 Indeed, a speech given on behalf of this grass-roots organization reflects perfectly the insurance-as-governance claim
N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 22, 2012, at A23.
70. See, e.g., Gina Columbus, N.J. Officials Assess New Flood Maps in Sandy’s Wake,
USA TODAY (Dec. 16, 2012, 8:28 PM), http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation/2012/
12/16/new-nj-flood-maps/1773733/; Stephen Stirling, Jersey Shore Revolution Begins, as
FEMA Releases New Flood Maps, NJ.COM (Dec. 16, 2012, 8:10 AM), http://www.nj.com/
news/index.ssf/2012/12/jersey_shore_revolution_begins.html.
71. See supra notes 65–66 and accompanying text.
72. See, e.g., Les Christie, Flood Insurance Costs Soaring for Thousands of Homeowners, CNN MONEY (Oct. 21, 2013, 4:57 AM), http://money.cnn.com/2013/10/21/real_estate/
flood-insurance/.
73. See, e.g., Stirling, supra note 70.
74. See Edward Van Embden, New Jersey to Adopt FEMA’s Flood Elevation Maps,
Christie Says, TOMS RIVER PATCH (New Jersey) (Jan. 25, 2013, 12:55 AM), http://tomsriv
er.patch.com/groups/politics-and-elections/p/new-jersey-to-adopt-fema-s-flood-elevationmaps-christie-says.
75. See Tracey Samuelson, Stop FEMA Now Hopes to Take Flood Reform Movement
National, NEWSWORKS (Sept. 29, 2013), http://www.newsworks.org/index.php/local/new-jer
sey/60340-stop-fema-now.
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that insurance is increasingly treated as government itself. It begins with “We the people,” and then makes its central claim, that
“[t]he American dream is becoming our nightmare as our rights to
life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness are now in jeopardy by
our own government’s ludicrous demands of increases in flood in76
surance premiums of 500% or more.” By May 2013, Governor
Christie caught this shift in the political winds and announced
77
his opposition to the NFIP rate increases, as did Congresswoman Maxine Waters, the co-author of the Biggert-Waters legisla78
tion. In October 2013, legislation to delay the FEMA rate increases for four years was introduced in the Senate by Mary
79
Landrieu (Democrat, Louisiana) and, not to be undone, in the
House of Representatives by her expected opponent in the 2016
80
election, Representative Bill Cassidy (Republican, Baton Rouge).
In late December 2013, the Tampa Bay Times called the impending NFIP rate increases one of the “top stories of the year.”81
As this essay goes to press, it seems as if most of the BiggertWaters rate increases will proceed as scheduled. Neither the
Landrieu nor the Cassidy bill has been passed by Congress.82 On
January 16, 2014, Congress enacted an omnibus $1.1 trillion
budget bill that would leave almost all Biggert-Waters rate increases untouched, save for an eight-month delay in increased
rates for previously-grandfathered, current homeowners whose
76. Michael P. Coyne, Stop FEMA Now, Speech, available at http://www.stopfe
manow.com/about/ (follow “speech from Michael P. Coyne” hyperlink).
77. See Scott Gurian, Explainer: Putting Biggert-Waters Flood Insurance Reform Act
in Perspective, NJSPOTLIGHT (Nov. 12, 2013), http://www.njspotlight.com/stories/13/11/
11/explainer-putting-biggert-waters-flood-insurance-reform-act-in-perspective/ (“Governor
Chris Christie . . . wrote to Congress last May, [expressing that] ‘foisting the additional
burden of a flood-insurance rate increase on home and business owners as currently proposed would be financially devastating.’”).
78. Id. (“Congresswoman Maxine Waters—who coauthored the original Act—now says
she’s outraged by the insurance premium increases many homeowners are facing, and
that she never intended for that to occur.”).
79. See Landrieu, Bipartisan Coalition to Introduce Flood Insurance Reform Bill,
MARY LANDRIEU (Oct. 25, 2013), http://www.landrieu.senate.gov/?p=press_release&id=40
23.
80. See Jordan Blum, Cassidy Files Flood Insurance Bill, THE ADVOCATE (Jan. 6,
2014), http://theadvocate.com/home/7820103-125/cassidy-files-flood-insurance-bill.
81. 2013: Top Stories of the Year, TAMPA BAY TIMES (Dec. 27, 2013, 11:21 PM), http://
www.tampabay.com/news/2013/2158824.
82. Flood Insurance Relief and Transparency Act of 2013, H.R. 3693, 113th Cong.
(2013); S. 996, 113th Cong. (2013). On January 30, 2014, the Senate passed the Landrieu
bill by a vote of 67 to 32. Press Release, Senator Mary Landrieu, Senate Passes Comprehensive Bill Delaying Flood Insurance Rate Hikes (Jan. 30, 2014), available at http:
//www.landrieu.senate.gov/?p=press_release&id=4201.
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rates would otherwise increase due to the greater flooding risks
revealed by FEMA’s new flood maps.83 There are announcements
by members of Congress in both parties that additional legislation will be introduced seeking broader, and deeper, rollbacks of
84
Biggert-Waters rate increases, but House Speaker John Boehner
has gone on record stating that the House will “not take up” legis85
lation that would delay the Biggert-Waters rate reforms.
CONCLUSION
The central point of this essay is that insurance has a role to
play, both as an institution and as a policy instrument, in debates
about the energy-water nexus. There is no more important debate
on this topic than the overarching one about the connections between our continued dependence on fossil fuels and the climatechange consequences it causes. Recently, commentators have bemoaned both a lack of political attention to climate change86 and a
lack of serious press coverage of the issue.87 What this commentary misses, however, is that a significant part of popular debate
on this issue is now taking place in the arena of insurance law
and policy. It is still too early to predict whether political and
83. See Andrew G. Simpson, Congressional Spending Plan Would Curb Some Flood
Insurance Rates, INS. J. (Jan. 15, 2014), http://www.insurancejournal.com/news/national/
2014/01/15/317118.htm (stating that the budget language will block FEMA from spending
funds for the remainder of the fiscal year, through September 30, 2014, to enforce higher
premiums on currently “grandfathered” properties that otherwise would have seen their
rates increase under Section 207 of the Biggert-Waters Act).
84. See, e.g., Kimberly Railey, Congress Scrambles as Coastal Residents Rail at Insurance Rates, BOSTON GLOBE (Jan. 19, 2014), http://www.bostonglobe.com/news/nation/2014/
01/19/massachusetts-lawmakers-seek-boost-taxpayer-subsidies-for-coastal-flood-insurance
/UpPekn4O8DBJq8ZWvPXNNL/story.html (“Members of Congress from coastal states including Massachusetts are banding together across party lines to respond to a rising tide
of constituent complaints and reverse increases in federal flood insurance premiums mandated by a bill passed in 2012. . . . The Senate could vote this month on a measure to restore the full subsidies and delay the increases for another four years.”).
85. See Bruce Alpert, House Speaker Boehner Says House Won’t Take Up Bill on 4Year Delay in Flood Insurance Increases, But More Modest Change Possible, NOLA.COM
(Jan. 16, 2014), http://www.nola.com/politics/index.ssf/2014/01/speaker_boehner_says_hou
se_won.html.
86. See, e.g., Dana R. Fisher et al., Mapping the Ideological Networks of American
Climate Politics, 116 CLIMATIC CHANGE 523, 524–25 (2013).
87. See, e.g., Margaret Sullivan, After Changes, How Green is the Times?, N.Y. TIMES,
Nov. 24, 2013, at SR12; Laura Santhanam, Study: How Broadcast News Covered Climate
Change in the Last Five Years, MEDIA MATTERS FOR AMERICA (Jan. 16, 2014), http://media
matters.org/research/2014/01/16/study-how-broadcast-news-covered-climate-change/1976
12.
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market feedback from the insurance debate will directly affect
policy discussions about alternative energy sources, improved energy efficiency, the unequal distribution of risks caused by climate change, and a host of other topics. But one thing is quite
clear. Currently, one aspect of the climate that people and politicians are intensely discussing involves the immediate and highly
salient costs, both to individual incomes and national budgets, of
doing nothing to ameliorate the growing costs of climate-related
catastrophes. In fact, precisely as the insurance-as-governance
literature would predict, the debate over insurance is on the front
lines in the national discussion about climate and the energywater nexus.

